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INTRODUCTION: 
COLLECTIVE INTERESTS , ‘PRÊT À PORTER’ 
JUSTICE? 
Individuals expect to be treated as such. We all want to be considered unique 
persons with unique characters (and at moments of introspection we may 
also admit to having character flaws), leading unique lives with unique sets 
of values and goals. Our sense of justice is modelled accordingly, so we may 
expect the institutions of the law to treat us as individuals as well.  
The reality is, however, that the law can hardly ever live up to this 
expectation. Take the idea in law that like cases are to be treated alike. 
Strictly speaking, this fundamental idea may in fact lead courts away from 
the individual into the direction of a more or less objective reflection on the 
case at hand rather than on the individual person involved. By comparing 
and distuingishing cases the person is thought to be treated fairly. In fact, the 
judicial process aims at categorizing the case fairly. 
Moreover, in regulating society, the legislature attempts to balance 
individual and collective interests. In doing so, it usually categorises 
individuals into groups of individuals, to attach certain rules to certain 
groups. Tax law and social security law are notable examples of this 
balancing act: the tax burden is assessed on the basis of abstract properties 
that can be applied relatively easily to massive numbers of persons. Social 
security usually sticks to a system of fixed amounts in benefits and fixed 
categories of beneficiaries, in order to keep the cost of administration and the 
likelihood of inequalities at a minimum. Such systems of distribution of 
wealth operate on the basis of aggregated data, fixed categories, structured 
templates and protocols. In essence, the law tries to categorize individuals 
into groups in order to deal with the need for mass justice effectively and 
swiftly, whilst providing an adequate level of individual justice.  
Why should settling mass claims for compensation and redress in 
private law be any different from this typology? One reason might be that 
the framework for adjudicating such claims  (tort law, contract law) is not 
primarily concerned with distributing, let alone redistributing, but rather with 
redressing wrongs commited against individuals. From a historical legal 
point of view, this might be true. However, it seems a position difficult to 
maintain in modern society. Try redressing ‘scattered damage’ (also referred 
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to as ‘trifle damage’) caused by breach of competition law – say, by 
horizontal price cartels – and resulting in slight price increases in consumer 
products. Such redress will not be affected by individual consumers, if they 
are left to individually access the institutions of justice. The costs outweigh 
the prospect of any benefit, and that would probably result in a sub-optimal 
number of claims reaching the pinnacle of the so-called conflict pyramid. 
Under those circumstances, individual access to justice may not be at par 
with effective resolution and an optimal level of compliance. And if claims 
are indeed substantial and economically viable, bringing them all to court at 
once may clog courts. The handling of similar claims in some sort of 
consolidated procedure may then be a viable alternative, provided that – 
again – collective interests and individual interests are balanced in a 
transparant procedure. Admittedly, any system of collective claims 
settlement has to balance the individual interests, the collective interest and 
the interest of the defendant (more often than not: industry, insurance, 
employers, manufacturers, government, et cetera).  
This is not a new dilemma, but what is new is that in recent years 
both the European scholarly and legislative debate on collective access to 
civil justice have grown more intense. Not only have there been attempts at 
consolidating the masses and doing justice to individuals simultaneously (for 
example: in England and Wales, the Group Litigation Order 1999; in 
Germany, the ‘Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz (KapMuG)’ 2005; in 
the Netherlands, the ‘Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade’ 2005; in 
Sweden, the ‘Lag om grupprättegång’ 2003), but the European Union seems 
to want to move forward as well. Recently, suggestions of introducing some 
sort of class action in consumer issues and in the domain of competition law 
enforcement have been voiced by the European Commission. 
This issue of the Erasmus Law Review adds another piece to the 
puzzle. The papers that you find in this issue bear witness to the delicate 
balancing act between ‘prêt à porter’ justice and ‘haute couture’ justice, 
made to fit the individual. Roger van den Bergh and Louis Visscher analyse 
the collective approach from a law and economics perspective; they turn to 
the fundamental matter of goals of private enforcement in the European legal 
order and they draw attention to the dangers that too much or too little 
private enforcement can cause. Moreover, they raise the problematic issue of 
accountability of the legal-service providers directing collective claims and 
make inventory of available instruments to balance the interests of the 
collective and their legal head man. 
Andrea Pinna addresses private international law issues concerning 
US class actions within the European legal order. His paper is of relevance 
for the issue of the ‘import’ of US class actions and implicitly raises an 
interesting subject for further analysis: the awakening ‘competition’ between 
the US class-action model and a potential European group action. The paper 
by Van Houtte and Yi convincingly shows that mass-settlement endeavours 
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in international post-conflict situations struggle with perfectly similar 
problems of balancing as do civil courts in managing mass claims. 
Moreover, their paper demonstrates that ‘prêt à porter’ justice elicits 
particular standards of due process.  
To conclude, we hope that this issue on collective claims will add to 
the debate on the right balance in European (private) law between individual 
right and collective enforcement. We thank the authors for their 
contributions to this issue and the anonymous reviewers for their comments.  
Willem van Boom 
